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## PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

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*The Vocation of Man*, by JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. Translated by William Smith, with biographical introduction by E. Ritchie. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1906. pp. lxii + 178.

*Spinoza and Religion*, by ELMER ELLSWORTH POWELL. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1906. pp. xiii + 344.

*An Introduction to Philosophy*, by GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. New York, Macmillan Company, 1906. pp. xiii + 322.

*Concepts of Philosophy*, by ALEXANDER THOMAS ORMOND. New York, Macmillan Company, 1906. pp. xxvii + 732.

*An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience*, by J. B. BAILLIE. London, Macmillan and Co., 1906. pp. xx + 344.

*Everyday Ethics*, by ELLA LYMAN CABOT. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1906. pp. xiii + 439.

Few works by any philosophical writer are more stimulating than Fichte's "Vocation of Man," which keeps ever before the reader the intimate connection of abstract speculation with the profoundest problems of human life; no work of its author exhibits so clearly the spirit and substance of his system. The Open Court Publishing Company renders the student a distinct service in adding this standard translation of it to its series of cheap reprints of philosophical classics.

In "Spinoza and Religion," Professor Powell, of Miami University, examines a question of perennial interest to students, and one still perhaps unsettled. Was Spinoza, as his contemporaries generally judged him, the 'prince of atheists,' or was he, as he has frequently since been regarded, a 'God-intoxicated' mystic? Taking the view that religion essentially involves belief in a higher power, or powers, of a personal kind, and that Spinoza's 'God' is plainly impersonal, the author concludes that Spinoza's system really is, and was intended to be, atheistic and anti-religious. The question turns chiefly on the interpretation of such technical terms as *intellectus infinitus*, *cogitatio infinita*, and *idea Dei*, and on the interpretation of certain apparently contradictory passages, such as Eth. II, 3, where it is said that "in God there is necessarily an idea as well of his essence as of all things that necessarily result from his essence," and Eth. I, 17, Schol., where an intellect and will like ours are expressly denied to God. Professor Powell shows considerable skill in dealing with the difficulties raised by the ambiguities in Spinoza's language, his great principle in explaining away the apparent implications of consciousness in God in such passages as the first here referred to being that of accommodation to scholastic modes of expression. He carries this principle so far, however, as to make it difficult to exonerate Spinoza from the charge of deliberate deception. If Spinoza was no mystic, his system is certainly a stupendous mystification. But if, as the author has so well shown, Spinoza's thought is full of contradictions, why not include his theism and mysticism with the rest?

Opinions naturally differ as to the best method of introducing col-

lege students to the study of philosophy. In a discipline which depends so much for its success on the personality of the teacher as well as on the character of the student and the conditions of the curriculum, there is probably no 'best' method. In the view of the present writer, there is no better approach to the problems of reflective thinking than through a sympathetic study of the history of Greek philosophy. It is impossible, however, to read Professor Fullerton's excellent "Introduction to Philosophy" without recognizing the many advantages of his method of approach, especially when used as a supplement to the historical. The arrangement of topics—the general nature of philosophy, the problems of the external world, the problems of the mind, the various types of philosophical theory, etc.—is admirable, and the distribution of the material well balanced. Particularly to be remarked is the skillful way in which Professor Fullerton, starting with the assumptions of the plain man, leads the student into the intricacies of the problems as they appear on mature reflection. His own views are expounded and defended with energy and exemplary clearness, and many of these the teacher of the book is likely as vigorously to combat; but the significant thing is that these views are presented with a singular freedom from dogmatism and that the student is everywhere stimulated and encouraged to think for himself. The book is the ripe product of many years of successful teaching, and for purposes of instruction is easily among the very best of its class.

From an introduction for beginners we pass in Ormond's "Concepts of Philosophy" to an elaborate treatise capable of taxing the patience and thought of the most advanced philosophical student. The work shows the same high qualities of grasp and penetration, of originality and conservatism, as the author's earlier volume, "The Foundations of Knowledge;" here, as there, the thought is always independent, thorough and painstaking, moving leisurely and untrammelled in wide open spaces. Ormond's point of departure is the opposition of science with its mechanical, and metaphysics with its teleological categories. Beginning with an analysis of the most general conceptions underlying respectively the scientific and philosophical constructions of experience, he then proceeds synthetically, by a successive advance from the physical to the social and thence to religion, to lay the foundations for a final, unified interpretation. He seeks to show that the concepts and methods of physical science, while applicable throughout the whole range of experience, are inadequate to the demands of synthesis which arise, with increasing urgency, as we ascend the scale of the sciences, and that they point to their transcendence in metaphysics, which subordinates the mechanical to the teleological, and in religion, in which the unity required is complete. By this method a system is constructed which carries to its conclusion the 'Copernican revolution' initiated by Kant, the central contention being that the fundamental reality is 'consciousness,' the energy which is aware both of itself and of its object; ultimately, the appeal is to an 'eternal consciousness.' But the unification of truth demanded by philosophy requires, it is held, not only the synthesis of science and metaphysics, but also the synthesis of knowledge and belief, and this final synthesis is an act of will. Hence God, freedom and immortality, to which theoretical considerations 'point,' appear, in the end, as practical postulates.

The idealistic construction of experience is carried out in a still more rigorous fashion by Professor J. B. Baillie, of the University of Aberdeen. His method is the method of Hegel, and his argument a free reproduction of the argument of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit.'

He seeks to show (1) that each phase of experience embodies in a specific way the one spiritual principle that animates all; (2) that each is distinct from the other simply by the way it embodies this principle; (3) that each is related to the others and to the whole in virtue of its realizing the principle with a certain degree of completeness; (4) that the whole of experience is a necessary evolution of the one principle through various forms logically connected as a series manifesting the principle. The main stages of the development are, first, that in which the individual subject is conscious of objects as *prima facie* outside the subject; second, that in which it is conscious of self as other than, and yet implicitly one with the subject; and third, that in which all sense of otherness is overcome and self and subject are transparently one (p. 134). No instructed reader can well deny the force and fascination of the method. It 'adopts,' if one chooses to say so, the principle it seeks to demonstrate, but it does this in no arbitrary way, for the principle is not external, one to which experience has to be fitted, but immanent; experience, in other words, essentially involves some sort of unity and relation of subject and object. The difficulty lies in connecting its various phases without mutilating any one of them, and in showing that the postulated unity is a really constitutive, and not merely an ideal or regulative principle of the whole. Professor Baillie has done, perhaps, all that can reasonably be expected to make the principle clear. The pragmatist who regards the unity of experience as confined to the individual experience from moment to moment will not be convinced, but he can hardly afford to ignore Professor Baillie's sympathetic, but penetrating, criticism (pp. 10-25).

Mrs. Cabot's instructive and well-written work on "Everyday Ethics" may be heartily commended to teachers in secondary schools who are looking for an experienced guide in the development of moral consciousness in their pupils. The book is the outcome of years of experience with the minds and needs of just such pupils. It avoids technical and abstract discussions and deals, in a live way, with the problems in which pupils of the high school age are, or can readily be made, interested. Its central ethical doctrine is that duty is found in fidelity and efficiency in one's chosen vocation, that "out of loyalty to our chosen work springs all moral life." Added to the main body of the text is a key to teachers, containing many excellent suggestions, numerous questions and additional illustrations.

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H. N. GARDINER.

*The Elements of Psychology*, by EDWARD L. THORNDIKE. A. G. Seiler, New York, 1905. pp. xix, 351.

*An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social Measurements*, by EDWARD L. THORNDIKE. The Science Press, New York, 1904. pp. xii, 212.

The aim of *The Elements of Psychology* is "to help students to learn the general principles of psychology." The volume is "designed to serve as a text-book for students who have had no previous training in psychology, who will not in nine cases out of ten take any considerable amount of advanced work in psychology, and who need psychological knowledge and insight to fit them to study, not the special theories of philosophy, but the general facts of human nature." The book is divided into three parts (Descriptive Psychology, Physiological Basis of Mental Life, and Dynamic Psychology), an Introduction and a Conclusion.

The Descriptive Psychology (Part I) is a modified abstract of James's *The Principles of Psychology*. It gives a general account of